Israeli military occupation in the Jordan Valley denies Palestinian farmers and herders their right to water, livelihood, and life

Last week, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory is a violation of international law. Michelle Rudolph and Rachel Kurian analyse how the water governance regime imposed by the Israeli occupation in the West Bank generates systemic injustice and water insecurity for Palestinians. Their study was presented at the teach-in on water justice in Palestine hosted by IHE Delft on the 29 of May.

The sun blazes fiercely, its early morning heat already engulfing the dry landscape. In this wide expanse, a community of tents stands resolute, their silhouettes distinct against the dusty backdrop. Dust settles on every surface, coating the worn fabric of shelters and clinging to the hot iron roofs and water troughs.

Abdullah stands quietly at the edge of the encampment. He wipes his sweat from his brow, his weathered face a testament to years spent under the sun. His sheep huddle in the scant shade, their woolly bodies pressed close together. Each animal is precious, providing milk, meat and wool that sustain his family. As he tends to his flock, a distant rumble disrupts the quiet, catching Abdullah’s attention. The sound of live military training echoes through the valley. His brows furrow as he listens intently, wondering if the manoeuvres will draw closer and disrupt the fragile peace. For a moment, he stands still, his eyes scanning the horizon, the weight of uncertainty heavy on his shoulders.

Yet, immediate concerns press upon him, anchoring him firmly in the present. The problem of finding water for his family and sheep looms large. The water troughs lie empty, a stark reminder of his ongoing struggle to secure this vital resource. Abdullah draws a deep breath, bracing himself for the challenges that lie ahead today, much like every other day before it.

Since the war of June 1967, nearly 90% of the Jordan Valley, West Bank, has been under Israeli military control and so has the distribution of water. As a Palestinian Bedouin in the valley, Abdullah lives alongside his extended family in tents devoid of running water. Groundwater lies beneath their feet, yet regulations prohibit them from digging a well. The Jordan River flows nearby, but its access has been blocked by the Israeli military and Civil Administration. Below the Bedouin encampment, a water pipeline supplies a neighbouring Israeli settlement with continuous water, but Abdullah and his family are strictly forbidden from tapping into it. In an attempt to secure water, Abdullah once constructed a small water tank, only to have it demolished by the Israeli military for lacking proper permission. Each morning, Abdullah grapples with the pressing question: How can he procure enough water for drinking, washing, cleaning, cooking, and caring for his children, while ensuring his sheep thrive to provide income for his family’s survival? Abdullah’s experiences, shared with us during an interview in July 2019, are similar to those of many Palestinians in this area.

In this blog post, we delve into the critical issue of water and human insecurity faced by Palestinian Bedouins and farmers. Drawing from our study on water governance in the West Bank, we explore the underlying causes of these insecurities.

Our research sheds light on the asymmetrical power relations that shape water governance, significantly impacting the lives of vulnerable communities. Central to our discussion is the concept of hydro-hegemony, introduced by Zeitoun and Warner in 2006. This concept was developed to help us understand how stronger riparian states use various tactics and strategies in cross-border water conflicts to assert their dominance. However, we can also apply it to our case in which Israel’s hydro-hegemony over groundwater resources in the West Bank is manifested through three forms of power:

• Material Power: This includes the use of military force, financial resources, and technological advancements.
• Bargaining Power: This involves strategic negotiations and the use of incentives to influence outcomes.
• Ideational Power: This encompasses the use of discourse and ideologies to shape perceptions and narratives. 

Our study shows that these power dynamics are not just abstract concepts but have real, tangible effects on the daily lives of Palestinians. The systemic and structural nature of water insecurity means that many Palestinians are not only denied their basic right to water but also their right to livelihoods and to life itself.

The research we draw on combines historical and contemporary data with information based on 27 in-depth interviews we conducted in 2019. These interviews were held in the West Bank, primarily with Palestinian women and men from various communities in the Jordan Valley. In addition, we spoke to representatives from crucial institutions like the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA), the Union of Agricultural Work Committees (UAWC), and the Palestinian development and training institution MA’AN. In the following sections, we detail some of the key features of the Jordan Valley and the nature and consequences of water governance in this area.

West Bank, Area C, and the Jordan Valley

The West Bank is a landlocked territory spanning approximately 5700 square kilometres – about one-seventh the size of the Netherlands. It is bordered by Jordan to the east and Israel on the north, south, and west and it has been under Israeli military occupation since June 1967.

The region is rich in freshwater resources, including the Jordan River and three major aquifers: the Western Aquifer, the North-Eastern Aquifer, and the Eastern Aquifer, that are collectively known as the ‘Mountain Aquifer’ and that extend through the West Bank and Israel (see map 1) (World Bank, 2009).

In 1967, the establishment of Kfar Etzion marked the beginning of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. These settlements, built by Israel and populated by Israeli citizens, have grown significantly over the decades. They are illegal under international law, as Article 49(6) of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV – also signed by Israel – explicitly prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilians into the occupied territory (ICRC, 2018). That Israel’s long-term occupation of Palestinian territory and settlement building are unlawful has also been confirmed by International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its recent ruling of 19 July 2024.

In 1993, the first Interim Agreement, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements known as Oslo I, was signed by the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). It recognised Israel as a state and created joint Israeli-Palestinian committees for ‘mutual security’ and economic cooperation on several aspects, including water. The second agreement of 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip known as Oslo II, divided the West Bank into three administrative zones – Areas A, B, and C – each with a different governance system. Area C which covers 60% of the West Bank and contains most of the agricultural lands and water resources, came under full Israeli civil and security control.

While these agreements seemed to facilitate some level of cooperation, in reality, they allowed Israel’s continued control over Palestinian resources. They legitimized Israel as the sole authority to decide which lands would come under Palestinian control and left open the resolution of key areas of conflict such as borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and settlements. Moreover, they provided no legal power to stop the expansion of settlements and roads in the West Bank (Roy, 2002).

The Jordan Valley, where Abdullah lives with his family, is situated in the eastern part of the West Bank. Most of this area falls within Area C (blue and purple areas on map 2), meaning it is under full Israeli military control. Often, these lands are designated as Israeli military zones (grey marked areas) or nature reserves (green marked area), restricting Palestinian access.

Referred to as a “giant greenhouse,” the Jordan Valley is ideal for irrigated agriculture due to its fertile soil, groundwater resources, ample sunlight, and warm climate. However, the stringent controls over land and water have led to a steady decline in Palestinian agricultural production throughout the occupation.

Unpacking Hydro-Hegemony: The Intersection of Material, Bargaining, and Ideational Power in Water Governance

The most visible impact of hydro-hegemony in water governance is Israel’s use of material power – military, finance, and technology – to assert control over water resources and distribution in ways that serve Israeli interests. Historical measures like Military Orders No. 92, 158, and 291, issued in 1967 and 1968, exemplify this control. They placed all West Bank water resources under Israeli military authority, introduced a permit system for new water infrastructure, and nullified prior water agreements, effectively centralizing decision-making power in Israeli hands (Messerschmid, 2014).

The establishment of Israeli settlements further solidified this control. Between 1967 and 1981, approximately 36 wells were drilled, with a significant number in the Jordan Valley, specifically catering to Jewish settlements (Lowi, 1993). In 1981, the wells that previously formed the main source for the Palestinian West Bank Water Department, were transferred to Mekorot, Israel’s national water company. This move granted Mekorot authority over water distribution in the West Bank, including allocations, tariffs, and infrastructure maintenance (Messerschmid, 2007).

The West Bank Water Department, once an administrative entity serving Palestinian communities, became an intermediary institution under Israeli oversight. It billed Palestinian users for water supplied by Mekorot, while its own operations and staffing were controlled by the Israeli Civil Administration – the Israeli civil-military body that operates in the West Bank – further consolidating Israeli influence over water governance (Selby, 2003).

Oslo I and Oslo II perpetuated and institutionalized these inequalities in water access. While Article 40  of Oslo II on water and sewage (MFA, 1995) ostensibly acknowledged Palestinian water rights and outlined cooperative water management between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the reality starkly contrasts with the rhetoric. Under Oslo II, only 20% of the water allocations from the Mountain Aquifer were designated for Palestinians, while Israel and its settlements retained control over 80% (Zeitoun et al., 2009). Notably, the water resources of the Jordan River were excluded from the agreement altogether. Prior to 1967, Palestinian farmers utilized approximately 150 pumps to extract water from the Jordan River (World Bank, 2009). Since then, Palestinians have been systematically denied any share or access to it (Koek, 2013).

Palestinians face significant barriers in developing their own water services and accessing water resources. The Israeli authorities impose stringent regulations requiring permits for drilling new wells, repairing existing ones, increasing water extraction, or constructing and modifying water supply and sewage infrastructure. Usually, these permits are denied, and even small-scale constructions like tanks and cisterns are subject to demolition by the Israeli military. Some infrastructure is confiscated by the Civil Administration under the pretext of being located in ‘firing zones’, designated areas for Israeli military exercises (Kadman, 2013).

In addition to legal obstacles, the disparity in material power further exacerbates inequalities in water access between Israeli settlements and Palestinian communities. For instance, when Palestinian villages were connected to Israeli water networks in the 1980s, they received pipes with smaller diameters compared to those provided to neighbouring settlers (Messerschmid, 2007). In some cases, flow reducers were introduced into the Palestinian pipes to render them ineffective and prone to pollution while the ‘joint reservoirs’ for Palestinians and the settlements were created such that Palestinians had access to outlets that were located at a higher altitude and that dried out in the summer months (Messerschmid, 2007).

The bargaining power of the Palestinians has also been severely compromised. An example is the functioning of the Joint Water Committee (JWC), established according to Oslo II and representing Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). An important insertion for the establishment of this committee was that all decisions were to be made on the basis of consensus. In reality, the PA, highly dependent on financial support and under pressure from donors does not have equal bargaining power as Israel, expressed in the disproportionately high number of permits granted to Israel (Selby, 2013).

Moreover, Oslo II transferred the accumulated debts of the West Bank Water Department, accrued due to non-payment by Palestinians, from Israel to the Palestinian Ministry of Finance (Selby, 2003). In these ways, the “formalisation of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation [through Oslo] enabled Israel to divest itself of some of the most onerous burdens of occupation” (Selby, 2003: 131) while allowing it to keep control over not only the water resources and supplies of Israeli settlements but effectively also those of Palestinians. As noted by Selby (2003: 138), the Oslo Accords were essentially “dressing up domination as ‘cooperation'”.

Physical discriminatory measures are accompanied by the use of ideational power in the form of supportive narratives and discourses that endorsed Israeli control over the region. This influence is exemplified by narratives and discourses that support Israel’s historical and religious claims to the land. For instance, the Zionist narrative asserts that historic Palestine is the rightful homeland of the Jewish people, invoking the Old Testament and Tanakh to justify Jewish settlement and agricultural development, where water holds symbolic significance as a sign of divine favour (Tadevosyan, 2019).

Conversely, Palestinian contributions to the development of the region have been systematically marginalized. Narratives often emphasize Israel’s pioneering spirit, democracy, and humanism, while downplaying or omitting the historical and cultural ties of Palestinians to the land (Edward Said, 1984).

While today ‘water scarcity in the region’ is widely accepted without question, Alatout (2008) reveals that from the 1930s to the 1950s, the prevailing perception was actually one of ‘water abundance’. This perception allowed experts to argue that Jewish immigration would not economically threaten the indigenous population of historic Palestine. It was only after 1959 that what Alatout terms the “Israeli network of water scarcity” emerged (2008: 960). This narrative justified and facilitated significant technical and political changes in Israeli governance and management of water resources. While water scarcity is very powerful fact and reality for Palestinians, it is important to recognise that it is also “politically induced” and it is a false narrative to suggest that it is a natural pre-condition (Messerschmid, 2014: 53).

Impact on Palestinian Communities and the Urgent Need for Action

So, what do these asymmetrical power relations in water governance mean for Palestinians farmers and herders in the Jordan Valley? Our research reveals that they are confronted with various, interconnected, and cumulative forms of water insecurity in their daily lives:

• Quantity – The quantitative supply gap is the starkest expression of the discriminatory water regime, as shown by the huge discrepancy in water consumption between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the Jordan Valley (see image). For example, in the Ro’i and Beka’ot settlements in the northern Jordan Valley, the average household consumption exceeds 400 litres per capita per day (lpcd), compared to just 20 lpcd in the neighboring Bedouin community of Al-Hadidiya (Hareuveni, 2011). Not being served by any network, many Palestinian Bedouin communities are forced to rely on water trucking, obtaining water from wells, springs, or filling points in other communities (UN, 2021). Some Palestinian farmers own their own wells. However, these are usually only a few dozen metres deep, in contrast to Israeli wells that regularly go down hundreds of metres to reach the aquifer. In past decades, groundwater levels have dropped significantly and so have the pumping rates from Palestinian wells. When Palestinian farmers have applied for permission to deepen their wells in order to regain access to fresh groundwater, their applications have often been denied by the JWC or the permission that they have received has not allowed them to dig as deep as required. A palm tree farmer from Al-Auja in the Jordan Valley told us his experience: “The first well in this village was dug in 1954. My father dug it. The depth of it was 40 m only. At that time, they reached the water at the level of 17 m. In 2011, I lost all the water from the well. It was fresh water, good water. From 2011 until 2015, I waited to receive a permission from the Israelis to dig deeper. I received permission to dig until 84 m. When I dug, the water was salty.”. This leads us to the issues around water quality.

• Quality – While the quality of the water from springs and the Israeli network was generally considered good, water from wells often has high concentrations of chloride, rendering it unsuited for domestic use and posing health risks to families and livestock when they do drink from it. “Sometimes my small children drink this water and become sick.”, one of the Bedouins shared with us.

• Distance and time – Water insecurity also results from the distance to water sources and the time required to collect water. Bedouin families who depend on water trucking endure long daily journeys to access fresh water, particularly challenging during the summer months.

• Price and Affordability – Access to water is often financially burdensome, the price depending on the cost of the electricity needed to pump groundwater, the cost of water distribution, and the cost of transporting the water. Particularly for Bedouins, it challenges their economic stability. One herder highlighted the strain: “There is a period in the year where there is no milk from the goats because of pregnancy. In this time, we don’t get money, but we [still] have to pay (…). It is a lot of money that we must pay for water every day”.

• Frequency and Reliability – Several of the issues discussed above show how Palestinians in the Jordan Valley experience water insecurity in relation to both the frequency and reliability of their water supplies. A mother of four from a Palestinian refugee camp that is connected to the Israeli water network from Mekorot said that she could access the network water just once a week, and even this was uncertain. As she said: “I know it will come today or tomorrow […] because since last Thursday it has not come”. During the interviews, it was highlighted that frequency and reliability of water access were also compromised through the use of military force by Israel’s Civil Administration, as when construction and movement restrictions were imposed on Palestinians and water-related supply systems (e.g. water tanks and pipes) were demolished by Israeli soldiers.

• Safety – Finally, the enforcement of military power in a context of conflict and occupation creates significant issues around safety of water access. One Bedouin father of eight shared his experience, explaining how he had been arrested several times by the Israeli military for unknowingly letting his sheep graze on closed-off land: “There are no borders. Only by experience you learn where (…) you can’t go”. He added that collecting water often took him several hours up to a full day, and getting arrested could make matters worse, leaving his family and animals without access to water. The situation is further aggravated by acts of violence perpetrated by armed Israeli settlers against Palestinians, including shootings and vandalism to property, which create a pervasive atmosphere of fear and insecurity. A local NGO member captured the dire reality of Palestinians in the Jordan Valley with stark clarity: “[They] are feeling threatened all the time. They are feeling insecure all the time. They have a lack of everything all the time”.

Living under these different forms of water and human insecurity has profound and far-reaching consequences for Palestinians, impacting their farming, herding, livelihoods, health, families and social relations. They are not just denied their fundamental right to water, but also their right to livelihood and life itself. As poignantly noted by a doctor from a health clinic in Area C in the Jordan Valley: “People here die twice in their lives. They die when they are alive, and they die when they are dying. […] no water, no cleaning, no hygiene, problems, conflicts […]”. At the same time, Palestinian farmers and herders are determined to remain on their land, undertaking various strategies to sustain their livelihoods and lives under extreme forms of violence, which we detail in another ongoing study.

This month marks five years since we spoke with Abdullah and many other Palestinian farmers and herders in the Jordan Valley. During this time, several Bedouin communities in the area have been demolished, and Israeli pressures have only intensified (UNRWA, 2024). Since October 7, reports of settler violence and Israeli military offenses have surged: As of now, 20 Bedouin communities in the West Bank have been forcibly displaced by armed extremist settlers often with the consent and support of the Israeli military which is, as argued by Forey (2024), a form of ethnic cleansing.

These escalating challenges underscore the dire and urgent need for action. The struggle for water and human security faced by Palestinians in the West Bank is not just a local issue but a fundamental human rights crisis. It demands our continued attention, advocacy, and efforts to support those affected and to push for lasting and just solutions.

You can read the full article here:

Rudolph, Michelle, and Rachel Kurian. “Hydro-Hegemony, Water Governance, and Water Security: Palestinians under Israeli Occupation in the Jordan Valley, West Bank.” Water Alternatives 15.1 (2022): 73-92.

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